Heading Off Correlated Failures through Independence-as-a-Service by Zhai, Ennan et al.
Heading Off Correlated Failures through Independence-as-a-Service
Ennan Zhai†, Ruichuan Chen§, David Isaac Wolinsky†, Bryan Ford†
†Yale University §Bell Labs / Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract
Today’s systems pervasively rely on redundancy to en-
sure reliability. In complex multi-layered hardware/soft-
ware stacks, however – especially in the clouds where
many independent businesses deploy interacting services
on common infrastructure – seemingly independent sys-
tems may share deep, hidden dependencies, undermin-
ing redundancy efforts and introducing unanticipated
correlated failures. Complementing existing post-failure
forensics, we propose Independence-as-a-Service (or
INDaaS), an architecture to audit the independence of
redundant systems proactively, thus avoiding correlated
failures. INDaaS first utilizes pluggable dependency ac-
quisition modules to collect the structural dependency
information (including network, hardware, and software
dependencies) from a variety of sources. With this infor-
mation, INDaaS then quantifies the independence of sys-
tems of interest using pluggable auditing modules, of-
fering various performance, precision, and data secrecy
tradeoffs. While the most general and efficient auditing
modules assume the auditor is able to obtain all required
information, INDaaS can employ private set intersection
cardinality protocols to quantify the independence even
across businesses unwilling to share their full structural
information with anyone. We evaluate the practicality of
INDaaS with three case studies via auditing realistic net-
work, hardware, and software dependency structures.
1 Introduction
Cloud services normally require high reliability, and per-
vasively rely on redundancy techniques to ensure this re-
liability [7, 10, 12, 29]. Amazon S3, for example, repli-
cates each data object across multiple racks in an S3 re-
gion [3]. iCloud rents infrastructures frommultiple cloud
providers – both Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Azure –
for redundancy [28]. Seemingly independent infrastruc-
ture components, however, may share deep, hidden de-
pendencies. Failures in these shared dependencies may
lead to unexpected correlated failures, undermining re-
dundancy efforts [19, 27, 34, 44, 47, 74, 75].
In redundant systems, a risk group [35] or RG is a set
of components whose simultaneous failures could cause
a service outage. Suppose some service A replicates crit-
ical state across independent servers B, C and D located
in three separate racks. The intent of this 3-way redun-
dancy configuration is for all RGs to be of size three, i.e.,
three servers must fail simultaneously to cause an outage.
Unbeknownst to the service provider, however, the three
racks share an infrastructure component, such as an ag-
gregation switch S. If the switch S fails for whatever rea-
son, B, C and D could become unavailable at the same
time, causing the service A to fail. We say such common
dependency introduces an unexpected RG, defined as a
smaller than expected RG, whose failure could disable
the whole service despite redundancy efforts.
This example, while simplistic, nevertheless illustrates
documented failures. In an Amazon AWS event [4],
a glitch on one Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS)
server disabled the EBS service across Amazon’s US-
East availability zones. The failure of the EBS service
caused correlated failures across multiple Elastic Com-
pute Cloud (EC2) instances utilizing that EBS for stor-
age, and in turn disabled applications designed for re-
dundancy across these EC2 instances. The EBS server
in this example was a single common dependency that
undermined the EC2’s redundancy efforts.
Discovering unexpected common dependencies is ex-
tremely challenging [20,22]. Many diagnostic and foren-
sic approaches attempt to localize or tolerate such fail-
ures after they occur [5, 12, 15, 24–27, 31, 37, 43].
These retroactive approaches, however, still require hu-
man intervention, leading to prolonged failure recovery
time [68]. Google has estimated that “close to 37% of
failures are truly correlated” within its global storage sys-
tem, but they lack the tools to identify these failure cor-
relations systematically [20].
Worse, correlated failures can be hidden not just by
inadequate tools or analysts within one cloud provider,
but also by non-transparent business contracts between
cloud providers forming complex multi-level service
stacks [19]. Application-level cloud services such as
iCloud [28] often redundantly rely on multiple cloud
providers, e.g., Amazon EC2 andMicrosoft Azure. How-
ever, a storm in Dublin recently took down a local power
source and its backup generator, disabling both the Ama-
zon and Microsoft clouds in that region for hours [16].
Providers of higher-level cloud services cannot read-
ily know how independent the lower-level services they
build on redundantly really are, since the relevant com-
mon dependencies (e.g., power sources) are often propri-
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etary internal information, which cloud providers do not
normally share [19, 69, 74].
We propose Independence-as-a-Service or INDaaS, a
novel architecture that aims to address the above prob-
lems proactively. Rather than localizing and tolerating
failures after an outage, INDaaS collects and audits
structural dependency data to evaluate the independence
of redundant systems before failures occur. In particu-
lar, INDaaS consists of a pluggable set of dependency
acquisition modules that collect dependency data, and
an auditing agent that employs a similarly pluggable set
of auditing modules to quantify the independence of re-
dundant systems and identify common dependencies that
may introduce unexpected correlated failures.
In the dependency acquisition phase, we introduce a
uniform representation for different types of dependency
data, enabling dependency acquisition modules to be tai-
lored and reused for a particular cloud provider’s infras-
tructure. As an example, our experimental prototype was
able to collect dependency data from various sources
with respect to network topologies, hardware compo-
nents, and software packages.
To represent this collected dependency data, INDaaS
builds on the traditional fault analysis techniques [52,
60], and further adapts these techniques to audit the in-
dependence of redundant systems. Our fault graph rep-
resentation supports three levels of detail appropriate
in different situations: component-sets, fault-sets, and
fault graphs. INDaaS can use component-sets to identify
shared components even if no failure likelihood informa-
tion is available. With fault-sets, INDaaS can take failure
likelihood information into account. Fault graphs further
enable INDaaS to account for deep internal structures in-
volving multiple levels of redundancy.
In its auditing phase, INDaaS offers multiple auditing
modules to address tradeoffs among performance, preci-
sion, and data secrecy. Our most powerful and informa-
tive auditing methods assume that a single independent
auditing agent is able to obtain all the required structural
dependency data in the clear. This assumption may hold
if the agent is a system run by and within a single cloud
provider, or if the agent is run by a trusted third party
such as a cloud insurance company or a non-profit un-
derwriting agency.
To support independence auditing even across mutu-
ally distrustful cloud providers who may be unwilling to
share full dependency data with anyone, INDaaS offers
private independence auditing or PIA. We have explored
two approaches to PIA. The first uses secure multi-party
computation [72], which offers the best generality in
principle but performs adequately only on small depen-
dency datasets [69]. We therefore focus here on the sec-
ond approach, based on private set intersection cardinal-
ity [38, 58]. This approach restricts INDaaS’s auditing
to the component-set level of detail, but we find it to be
practical and scalable to large datasets.
We have developed a prototype INDaaS auditing sys-
tem, and evaluated its performance with three small
but realistic case studies. These case studies exercise
INDaaS’s two capabilities: 1) proactively quantifying the
independence of given redundancy configurations, and 2)
identifying potential correlated failures. We find that the
prototype scales well. For example, the prototype can
audit a cloud dependency structure containing 27,648
servers and 2,880 switches/routers, and identify about
90% of relevant dependencies, within 3 hours.
Our INDaaS prototype has many limitations, and
would need to be refined and customized to particu-
lar cloud environments before real-world deployment.
Nevertheless, even as a proof-of-concept, we feel that
INDaaS represents one step towards building reliable
cloud infrastructures whose redundancy structures can
avoid various types of unexpected common-mode fail-
ures [23], emergent risks due to overwhelming complex-
ity [44], and proprietary information barriers that natu-
rally arise in the cloud ecosystem [19].
In summary, this paper’s contributions are: 1) the first
architecture designed to audit the independence of re-
dundant cloud systems before or during deployment; 2)
adaptation of fault graph analysis techniques to support
multiple levels of detail in explicit dependency struc-
tures; 3) an efficient fault graph analysis technique that
scales to large datasets representing realistic cloud in-
frastructures; 4) an application of private set intersection
cardinality techniques to enable efficient private indepen-
dence auditing; 5) a prototype implementation and eval-
uation of INDaaS’s practicality with small but realistic
case studies and larger-scale simulations.
2 Architecture Overview
We now present a high-level overview of the INDaaS ar-
chitecture, deferring details to subsequent sections. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the basic INDaaS workflow, which in-
volves three main roles or types of entities: auditing
client, dependency data source, and auditing agent.
The auditing client, i.e., Alice in Figure 1, requests an
audit of the independence of two or more cloud systems,
which may either be operated by Alice herself or rented
from other cloud providers, and which she believes to
be independent so as to offer redundancy. For example,
Alice may request a one-time independence audit prior to
deploying a new service onto multiple redundant clouds,
like iCloud’s use of both Amazon EC2 and Microsoft
Azure [28]. Alice might also request periodic audits on a
deployed configuration to identify correlated failure risks
that configuration changes or evolution might introduce.
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Figure 1: An example INDaaS auditing process, where
an auditing client Alice wishes to audit the independence
of a two-way redundancy deployment.
Dependency data sources (or data sources for brevity)
represent the providers of cloud systems whose inde-
pendence the auditing client wishes to check. The data
sources in practice may be providers of computation,
storage and networking components to be used redun-
dantly by the auditing client. INDaaS might be deployed
so as to utilize data sources either from a single provider
or across multiple providers. In the first case, a stor-
age service like Amazon S3 might provide data sources
for each of multiple Amazon data centers offering intra-
provider redundancy for S3. In the second, inter-provider
scenario, Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Azure might serve
as distinct data sources for redundant services rented
by iCloud. Either way, as shown in Figure 1, each data
source employs pluggable dependency acquisition mod-
ules to collect structural dependency data on its com-
ponents such as network topology, hardware devices, or
even software packages whose dependencies could lead
to common-mode failures (e.g., Heartbleed [23]).
The auditing agent mediates the interaction between
the auditing client and the data sources. In the case where
the auditing agent can obtain the dependency data from
all the relevant data sources, the auditing agent constructs
a dependency graph based on the data from these data
sources. Then, the agent processes the dependency graph
and quantifies its independence, or identifies any unex-
pected common dependencies using a set of pluggable
independence auditingmodules. In the case of private in-
dependence auditing, the agent cannot obtain the full de-
pendency data from data sources in cleartext, but super-
vises a private set intersection cardinality protocol per-
formed by the data sources collaboratively.
We briefly summarize the independence auditing pro-
cess as illustrated in Figure 1:
Step 1: The auditing client, Alice, specifies to the au-
diting agent what services she wishes to audit and in
Table 1: Format definition of various dependencies.
Type Dependency Expression
Network <src="S" dst="D" route="x,y,z"/>
Hardware <hw="H" type="T" dep="x"/>
Software <pgm="S" hw="H" dep="x,y,z"/>
what way. This specification includes: a) the relevant
data sources; b) the level of redundancy desired; c) the
types of components and dependencies to be considered;
and d) the metrics used to quantify independence.
Step 2: The auditing agent issues a request to each data
source Alice specified.
Step 3: Each specified data source uses one or more
dependency acquisition modules to collect the depen-
dency data for future independence auditing (see §3).
Step 4: In the private independence auditing (or PIA)
case, the data sources collaborate to obtain the auditing
results without revealing the proprietary dependency data
to each other (see §4.2).
Step 5: Each data source returns to the auditing agent
either the full dependency data for structural indepen-
dence auditing (see §4.1), or in the PIA case, returns the
collaboratively computed independence auditing results.
Step 6: The auditing agent returns to Alice an audit-
ing report quantifying the independence of various re-
dundancy deployments, optionally computing some use-
ful information such as the estimates of correlated failure
probabilities and ranked lists of potential risk groups.
3 Dependency Acquisition
Acquiring accurate structural dependency data within
heterogeneous cloud systems is non-trivial, and realis-
tic solutions would need to be adapted to different cloud
environments. As many dependency acquisition tools
have been deployed in today’s clouds for various pur-
poses (e.g., system diagnosis) [2, 5, 6, 14, 15, 18, 31, 36,
37, 39], we expect such tools can be adapted and reused
to collect the dependency data required by INDaaS.
Towards this end, INDaaS leverages pluggable de-
pendency acquisition modules (DAM), and maintains a
uniform representation of different types of dependency
data. Different data sources first collect dependency data
through their dependency acquisition systems or service
monitoring systems, and then adapt the collected data to
a common XML-based format illustrated in Table 1. Fi-
nally, the DAM stores the adapted dependency data in a
database, DepDB, for further processing.
Table 1 shows how our prototype expresses network,
hardware, and software dependencies. Each such depen-
dency corresponds to one of the three most common
causes of correlated failures [22, 68]: incorrect network
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Figure 2: A sample distributed storage system.
configurations, faulty hardware components, and buggy
or insecure software packages.
A network dependency describes a route from source
S to destination D via various network components in
between, such as routers and/or switches x, y, and z.
A hardware dependency describes a physical compo-
nent, e.g., a disk or CPU of a server. The hw field denotes
a physical component, and type specifies the type of
this component such as CPU, disk, RAM, etc. The dep
field specifies the model number of the component.
A software dependency describes the package infor-
mation of a software component. The pgm field denotes
the software component S itself, hw specifies the hard-
ware H on which the S runs, and dep specifies various
packages x, y and z used by S.
Dependency acquisition examples. Our INDaaS pro-
totype currently includes three dependency acquisition
modules employing existing tools to collect various raw
dependency data, then adapt them into the common
format as discussed above. In particular, we employ
NSDMiner [31, 46] to collect network dependencies,
HardwareLister [61] to collect hardware dependencies,
and apt-rdepends [17] to collect software dependencies.
These first-cut INDaaS modules are in no way intended
to be definitive but merely aim to provide some examples
of realistic dependency acquisition methods.
NSDMiner is a traffic-based network data collector,
which discovers network dependencies by analyzing net-
work traffic flows collected from network devices or in-
dividual packets [31,46]. HardwareLister (lshw) extracts
a target machine’s detailed hardware configuration in-
cluding CPUs, disks and drivers [61]. The apt-rdepends
tool extracts the software package and library dependen-
cies for popular Linux software distributions [17].
Figure 2 illustrates a sample distributed storage sys-
tem. Suppose an auditing client desires two-way redun-
dancy for her service running on two of the three servers
S1-S3 within her cloud. She submits to the auditing agent
a specification indicating: 1) IP addresses of the three
servers, and 2) relevant software components running on
Network dependencies of S1 and S2:
<src="S1" dst="Internet" route="ToR1,Core1"/>
<src="S1" dst="Internet" route="ToR1,Core2"/>
<src="S2" dst="Internet" route="ToR1,Core1"/>
<src="S2" dst="Internet" route="ToR1,Core2"/>
------------------------------------
Hardware dependencies of S1 and S2:
<hw="S1" type="CPU" dep="S1-Intel(R)X5550@2.6GHz"/>
<hw="S1" type="Disk" dep="S1-SED900"/>
<hw="S2" type="CPU" dep="S2-Intel(R)X5550@2.6GHz"/>
<hw="S2" type="Disk" dep="S2-SED900"/>
------------------------------------
Software dependencies of S1 and S2:
<pgm="QueryEngine1" hw="S1" dep="libc6,libgccl">
<pgm="Riak1" hw="S1" dep="libc6,libsvn1">
<pgm="QueryEngine2" hw="S2" dep="libc6,libgccl">
<pgm="Riak2" hw="S2" dep="libc6,libsvn1">
Figure 3: A sample of the collected dependency data.
these servers. Our current prototype requires the audit-
ing client to list software components of interest man-
ually – e.g., Query Engine and Riak [8] (a distributed
database) in this example. With this specification, the
auditing agent invokes the dependency acquisition mod-
ules (i.e., NSDMiner, lshw, and apt-rdepends) on each
server to collect the network, hardware, and software de-
pendencies, and store them in the DepDB, as shown in
Figure 3.
4 Independence Auditing
After dependency data acquisition, INDaaS performs in-
dependence auditing to generate auditing reports.
As described in §2, INDaaS supports two scenarios.
We first present a structural independence auditing pro-
tocol in §4.1, which assumes data sources are willing
to provide the auditing agent with the full dependency
data, e.g., for auditing a common cloud provider. We later
present a private independence auditing protocol in §4.2
to support analysis across multiple cloud providers un-
willing to reveal the full dependency data to anyone.
4.1 Structural Independence Auditing
Upon acquiring full dependency data from the data
sources, the auditing agent executes our structural in-
dependence auditing (SIA) protocol to generate the de-
pendency graph, determine the risk groups, rank the risk
groups, and eventually generate an auditing report.
4.1.1 Generating Dependency Graph
To implement structural independence auditing, the au-
diting agent first generates an explicit dependency graph
representation, which will later be used by the pluggable
auditing modules. In designing this representation, we
adapt traditional fault tree models [52, 60] to a directed
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Figure 4: Dependency graphs represented at three different levels of detail: (a) component-set level of detail, (b)
fault-set level of detail, and (c) fault graph level of detail.
acyclic graph structure, and generalize the representation
to express dependencies at any of three different levels of
detail: component-set, fault-set and fault graph.
Component-set. At the most basic level of detail, we
organize dependencies in terms of component-sets. As
shown in Figure 4(a), if a system E1 depends on compo-
nents A1 and A2, and another system E2 depends on com-
ponents A2 and A3, then the two relevant component-sets
are {A1,A2} and {A2,A3}, respectively. E1 and E2 are
the data sources. At this level of detail, for independence
reasoning, we focus only on the presence of shared com-
ponents – e.g., A2 – that may lead to correlated failures.
As Figure 4(a) illustrates, we express component-sets
in a two-level “AND-of-ORs” dependency graph. This
structure consists of two types of nodes: components and
logic gates. If a component fails (or not), it outputs a
1 (or 0) to its higher-layer logic gate. The two types
of logic gates, AND and OR, depict the different logi-
cal relationships among components’ failures. For an OR
gate, if any of its subsidiary components fails, this failure
propagates upwards. For an AND gate, only if all of its
subsidiary components fail, the gate propagates a failure
upwards. The top-level AND gate thus represents redun-
dancy across the data sources (e.g., E1 and E2), each of
which uses an OR gate to connect all its dependent com-
ponents. Our representation also supports n-of-m redun-
dant deployments (n≤ m) via n-of-m AND gates.
Fault-set. At the fault-set level of detail, we addition-
ally assign some form of weight to each component, e.g.,
probability of failure over some time period. As shown
in Figure 4(b), the failure of A1 or A2 leads to the out-
age of system E1; thus, the two failure events {A1 fails,
A2 fails} form a fault-set. Hereafter, when reasoning at
the fault-set level, we assign each failure event a failure
probability between 0 and 1. Approaches to obtaining re-
alistic failure probabilities are discussed later in §5.1.
Fault graph. The component-set and fault-set levels of
detail assume a single level of redundancy across data
sources (e.g., E1 and E2), each depending on a “flat” set
of components among which any failure causes the re-
spective data source to fail. The fault graph, the richest
level of detail INDaaS supports, can describe more com-
plex dependency structures as shown in Figure 4(c). In a
fault graph, event nodes having no child nodes are called
basic events, the root node is called the top event, and
the remaining nodes are intermediate events. Each node
in a fault graph has a weight expressing the failure prob-
ability of the associated event. A fault graph is evaluated
from basic events to the top event. Each top and interme-
diate event has an input gate connecting the lower-layer
events. For example, in Figure 4(c), the top event’s input
gate is an AND gate representing top-level redundancy,
but the fault graph also expresses internal redundancy via
the internal AND gates at lower levels.
Building the dependency graph. Any dependency
graph, at whichever level of detail, in principle represents
the underlying structure of a top-level service across a
number of redundant systems. Each such system is a data
source where the auditing agent can obtain the depen-
dency data. Automatically building a fault graph with the
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dependency data is non-trivial in practice. We summarize
here how the auditing agent builds a dependency graph
at the fault graph level of detail from top to bottom.
Step 1: The fault graph’s top event is the failure of the
entire redundancy deployment R.
Step 2: According to the auditing client’s specifica-
tion (see Step 1 in §2), the auditing agent sends a query to
the dependency information database DepDB for infor-
mation about all servers given in the specification. Each
server’s failure event then becomes a child node of the
top event, and an AND gate connects the top event with
its child nodes to express the servers’ redundancy.
Step 3: The auditing agent then queries DepDB for
each server’s network, hardware, and software depen-
dencies. As a result, each server’s failure event has three
child nodes, i.e., network, software, and hardware fail-
ure events. An OR gate connects the server failure event
with its three child nodes, since the failure of any of these
dependencies effectively causes the server to fail.
Step 4: For the hardware failure event of each server,
the auditing agent gets its dependency data from DepDB,
then uses an OR gate to connect the hardware failure
event with its dependencies’ failure events.
Step 5: For each server’s network failure event, the
auditing agent queries DepDB for network paths rele-
vant to the server, then connects them as child nodes
to the server’s network failure event. The agent puts an
AND gate between the network failure event and child
nodes representing redundant paths, while network de-
vices comprising each path are connected by an OR gate.
Step 6: The auditing agent repeats Step 5 to construct
the child nodes for each server’s software failure event.
Different layers of software components are connected
by an OR gate, and all packages underlying a software
component are connected by an OR gate.
As an example, the redundancy deployment in Fig-
ure 2 may be represented by the fault graph in Fig-
ure 4(c). An information-rich fault graph may be “down-
graded” to the lower fault-set or component-set levels of
detail, by discarding partial information in a fault graph.
Our INDaaS prototype can also compose individual
dependency graphs collected from multiple services into
more complex aggregate dependency graphs (e.g., EC2
instances depending on services offered by EBS and
ELB). Details on dependency graph composition may be
found in the associated technical report [75].
4.1.2 Determining Risk Groups
After building a dependency graph, SIA needs to deter-
mine risk groups (RGs) of interest in the dependency
graph. The SIA provides two pluggable auditing algo-
rithms which make trade-offs between accuracy and effi-
ciency. The minimal RG algorithm computes precise re-
sults, but its execution time increases exponentially with
the size of dependency graph, making it impractical on
large datasets. The failure sampling algorithm, in con-
trast, runs much faster but scarifies accuracy. Both algo-
rithms operate on dependency graphs represented at any
level of detail. Without loss of generality, hereafter we
elaborate on the algorithms at the fault graph level.
Minimal RGs. An RG within a dependency graph is a
group of basic failure events with the property that if all
of them occur simultaneously, then the top event occurs
as well. For example, in Figure 4(a), if A1 and A3 fail
simultaneously, the redundancy deployment fails. Here,
{A1,A3}, {A1,A2}, {A1,A2,A3}, {A2}, and {A2,A3} are
five RGs. Some RGs, however, are more critical than oth-
ers. We define an RG as a minimal RG if the removal of
any of its constituent failure events makes it no longer
an RG. Consider the following two RGs: {A1,A2} and
{A2,A3} in Figure 4(a). Neither are minimal RGs be-
cause {A2} alone is sufficient to cause the top event to oc-
cur; thus, the minimal RGs should be {A2} and {A1,A3}.
As another example, the minimal RGs in Figure 4(c) are
{ToR1 fails}, {Core1 fails, Core2 fails}, etc.
Minimal RG algorithm. The first algorithm for deter-
mining RGs is adapted from classic fault tree analysis
techniques [52, 60]. This algorithm traverses a depen-
dency graphG in a reverse breadth-first order (from basic
events to the top event). Basic events first generate RGs
containing only themselves, while non-basic events pro-
duce RGs based on their child events’ RGs and their in-
put gates. For a non-basic event, if its input gate is an OR
gate, the RGs of this event include all its child events’
RGs; otherwise, if its input gate is an AND gate, each
RG of this event is an element of the cartesian product
among the RGs of its child events. Traversing the depen-
dency graph G generates all the RGs, and in turn all the
minimal RGs through simplification procedures. This al-
gorithm produces precise results, but is NP-hard [59].
Failure sampling algorithm. To address the efficiency
issue, we developed an RG detection algorithm based
on random sampling, which makes a trade-off between
accuracy and efficiency. This algorithm uses multiple
sampling rounds, each of which performs a breadth-first
traversal of the dependency graph G. Within each sam-
pling round, the algorithm assigns either a 1 or a 0 to each
basic event of G based on random coin flipping, where 1
represents failure and 0 represents non-failure. Starting
from such an assignment, the algorithm assigns 1s and
0s to all non-basic events from bottom to top based on
their logic gates and the values of their child events. Af-
ter each sampling round, the algorithm checks whether
the top event fails. If it fails (i.e., its value is 1), then
the algorithm generates an RG consisting of all the basic
events being assigned a 1 in this sampling round. The al-
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gorithm executes a large number of sampling rounds and
aggregates the resulting RGs in all rounds. The failure
sampling algorithm offers the linear time complexity, but
is non-deterministic and cannot guarantee that the result-
ing RGs it identifies are minimal RGs. This failure sam-
pling algorithm is similar in principle to heuristic SAT al-
gorithms such as ApproxCount [67], and these methods
may offer ways to improve INDaaS failure sampling.
4.1.3 Ranking Risk Groups
After determining RGs, we have two algorithms to rank
them and generate the RG-ranking list.
Size-based ranking. To rank RGs at the component-
set level or at the unweighted fault graph level, we use
a simple size-based ranking algorithm which ranks RGs
based on the number of components in each RG. While
this algorithm cannot distinguish which potential compo-
nent failures may be more or less likely, identifying RGs
with fewer components – especially any of size 1 indi-
cating no redundancy – can point to areas of the system
that may warrant closer manual inspection. For example,
in Figure 4(c), the RGs {ToR1} and {libc6} are ranked
highest since they have the least size.
Failure probability ranking. In cases where the prob-
abilities of failure events can be estimated, we provide
a probability-based ranking algorithm to evaluate RGs
at the levels of fault-set and weighted fault graph. This
algorithm ranks RGs by their relative importance. Here,
for a given RG’s failure event (say, C), its relative im-
portance, IC, is computed using the probability of C,
Pr(C), in comparison to the probability of the top event
T , Pr(T ): IC = Pr(C)/Pr(T ). Specifically, Pr(C) is the
probability that all the events in C occur simultaneously,
and Pr(T ) is computed by the inclusion-exclusion prin-
ciple where the involved sets are all the minimal RGs of
T . In Figure 4(b), since the probabilities of events A1,
A2 and A3 are 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3, respectively, we have:
Pr(T ) = 0.1 · 0.3+ 0.2− 0.1 · 0.3 · 0.2 = 0.224. There-
fore, the relative importances of the minimal RGs {A2
fails} and {A1 fails, A3 fails} are: 0.2/0.224 = 0.8929
and 0.03/0.224 = 0.1339, respectively. As a result, {A2
fails} is ranked higher than {A1 fails, A3 fails}.
4.1.4 Generating the Auditing Report
Upon getting the RG-ranking lists for all redundancy
deployments, SIA computes an independence score for
each of them. If the size-based ranking algorithm is used,
a given redundancy deployment R’s independence score
is computed as indep(R) = ∑ni=1 size(ci), where ci de-
notes the ith RG in the R’s RG-ranking list, and n de-
notes the number of top RGs in the RG-ranking list used
for this independence evaluation. If the failure probabil-
ity based ranking algorithm is used, a given redundancy
deployment R’s independence score is then indep(R) =
∑
n
i=1 Ici , where Ici denotes the relative importance of ci.
The auditing agent generates an auditing report by
ranking all the redundancy deployments based on their
independence scores, and finally sends the report back to
the auditing client for reference. With the auditing report,
the auditing client might for example select the most in-
dependent redundancy deployment for her service.
The auditing report can also help an auditing client
understand unexpected common dependencies to focus
further analysis. In the case of one documented Amazon
EC2 outage, for example [4], we speculate that the avail-
ability of an INDaaS auditing report might have enabled
the operators to notice that a specific EBS server had be-
come a common dependency, and fix it, thus avoiding the
outage.
4.2 Private Independence Auditing
We now address the challenge of independence auditing
across mutually distrustful data sources, e.g., multiple
cloud providers, who may be unwilling to share depen-
dency data with each other or any third-party auditor. To
reflect the motivating deployment model, we use the term
cloud providers instead of data sources when describing
the private independence auditing (PIA) protocol.
The most general and direct approach, explored by
Xiao et al. [69], is to use secure multi-party computa-
tion (SMPC) [72] to compute and reveal overlap among
the datasets of multiple cloud providers while keeping
the data themselves private. This approach works in the-
ory, but scales poorly in practice due to its inherent com-
plexity. We find SMPC to be impractical currently even
for datasets with only a few hundreds of components.
We thus focus henceforth on a more scalable ap-
proach built on private set intersection cardinality tech-
niques [21, 38, 58, 73]. This approach sacrifices general-
ity and dependency graph expressiveness, operating only
at the component-set level of detail. The basic idea is to
evaluate Jaccard similarity [32] using a private set inter-
section cardinality protocol [58] to quantify the indepen-
dence of redundancy configurations.
4.2.1 Trust Assumptions
As described in §2, our architecture consists of entities
filling three roles: auditing client, cloud providers (i.e.,
data sources in Figure 1), and auditing agent.
We assume that auditing clients are potentially mali-
cious and wish to learn as much as possible about the
cloud providers’ private dependency data. We assume
cloud providers and the auditing agent are honest but cu-
rious: they run the specified PIA protocol faithfully but
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may try to learn additional information in doing so. We
assume there is no collusion among cloud providers and
the auditing agent. We discuss some potential solutions
to dealing with dishonest parties in §5.2.
4.2.2 Technical Building Blocks
There are three technical building blocks that we utilize
throughout the PIA design.
Jaccard similarity. Jaccard similarity [32] is a
widely-adopted metric for measuring similarity across
multiple datasets. Jaccard similarity is defined as
J(S0, · · · ,Sk−1) = |S0∩·· ·∩Sk−1|/|S0∪·· ·∪Sk−1|where
Si denotes the ith dataset. A Jaccard similarity J close to 1
indicates high similarity, whereas a J close to 0 indicates
the datasets are almost disjoint. In practice, datasets with
similarity J ≥ 0.75 are considered significantly corre-
lated [62]. While there are many other similarity metrics,
e.g., the Sørensen-Dice index [57], we choose Jaccard
similarity because it is efficient, easy to understand, and
extends readily to more than two datasets.
MinHash. Computing the Jaccard similarity incurs a
complexity linear with the dataset sizes. In the pres-
ence of large datasets, an approximation of the Jaccard
similarity based on MinHash is often preferred [11]. The
MinHash technique [13] extracts a vector {h(i)min(S)}mi=1
of a dataset S through deterministic sampling, where
h(1)(·), · · · ,h(m)(·) denotem different hash functions, and
h
(i)
min(S) denotes the item e ∈ S with the minimum value
h(i)(e). Let δ denote the number of datasets satisfying
h
(i)
min(S0) = · · ·= h(i)min(Sk−1). Then, the Jaccard similarity
J(S0, · · · ,Sk−1) can be approximated as δ/m. Here, the
parameter m correlates to the expected error to the pre-
cise Jaccard similarity— a largerm (i.e., more hash func-
tions) yields a smaller approximation error. Broder [13]
proves that the expected error of MinHash-based Jaccard
similarity estimation is O(1/
√
m).
Private set intersection cardinality. A private set in-
tersection cardinality protocol allows a group of k ≥ 2
parties, each with a local dataset Si, to compute the num-
ber of overlapping elements among them privately with-
out learning any elements in other parties’ datasets. We
adopt P-SOP, a private set intersection cardinality pro-
tocol based on commutative encryption [58]. In P-SOP,
all parties form a logical ring, and agree on the same
deterministic hash function (e.g., SHA-1 or MD5). In
addition, each party has its own permutation function
used to shuffle the elements in its local dataset, as well
as its own public/private key pair used for commutative
encryption [50, 56]. Commutative encryption offers the
property that EK(EJ(M)) = EJ(EK(M)) where EX de-
notes using X’s public key to encrypt the message M.
In P-SOP, each party first makes every element in its
own dataset Si identical. Specifically, any element e ap-
pearing t times in Si is represented as t unique elements
{e‖1, · · · ,e‖t}, with ‘‖’ being a concatenation operator.
Each party then hashes and encrypts every individual el-
ement in its dataset, and randomly permutes all the en-
crypted elements. Afterwards, each party sends the en-
crypted and permuted dataset to its successor in the ring.
Next, once the successor receives the dataset, it simply
encrypts each individual element in the received dataset,
permutes them, and sends the resulting dataset to its suc-
cessor. The process repeats until each party receives its
own dataset whose individual elements have been en-
crypted and permuted by all parties in the ring. Finally,
all parties share their respective encrypted and permuted
datasets, so that they can count the number of common
elements in these datasets, i.e., |∩iSi|, as well as the num-
ber of unique elements in these datasets |∪i Si|.
4.2.3 Generating Dependency Graph
To perform private independence auditing, each cloud
provider pi (holding an individual data source) within
a given redundancy deployment R first generates its
local dependency graph at the component-set level.
In addition, each pi needs to normalize its generated
component-set. This normalization ensures that the same
component shared across different cloud providers al-
ways has the same identifier.
Common sources of correlated failures across cloud
providers are third-party components such as routers and
software packages [19]. Therefore, our current PIA pro-
totype normalizes two types of components: 1) third-
party routing elements (e.g., ISP routers), and 2) third-
party software packages (e.g., the widely-used OpenSSL
toolkit). PIA normalizes these components as follows:
1) for routers, PIA uses their accessible IP addresses
as unique identifiers, and 2) for software packages,
PIA uses their standard names plus version numbers as
unique identifiers. In so doing, any given component
in all cloud providers’ generated component-sets has a
unique normalized identifier.
4.2.4 Auditing Independence Privately
If cloud providers involved in a potential redundancy
deployment have relatively small component-sets, PIA
takes these (normalized) component-sets Si directly as
input to the private set intersection cardinality protocol
(P-SOP) to compute the number of common components
| ∩i Si| and the number of unique components | ∪i Si|
across cloud providers. With the two numbers, PIA can
compute the Jaccard similarity as | ∩i Si|/| ∪i Si| to eval-
uate the independence of this redundancy deployment.
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Otherwise, if cloud providers in a potential redun-
dancy deployment have large component-sets, PIA uses
m hash functions based on the MinHash technique to
map each such component-set to a much smaller dataset
Si, and then takes these MinHash-generated datasets as
input to the P-SOP as normal to get the number of com-
mon components across cloud providers, i.e., | ∩i Si|. As
discussed in §4.2.2, the Jaccard similarity can then be ap-
proximated as | ∩i Si|/m. This MinHash-based approach
leads to much higher efficiency but lower accuracy. To
increase the accuracy, we can use more hash functions in
MinHash. How to make the trade-off between efficiency
and accuracy depends on the application domain.
4.2.5 Generating the Auditing Report
In the design as so far, each cloud provider pi has com-
puted the Jaccard similarities (or estimated Jaccard sim-
ilarities using MinHash) corresponding to all the redun-
dancy deployments involving pi. After collecting these
Jaccard similarities from all cloud providers, the audit-
ing agent generates an auditing report ranking all the re-
dundancy deployments based on the Jaccard similarities,
and finally sends this report to the auditing client. For
an n-of-m redundancy deployment (n ≤ m), the auditing
agent needs to obtain the Jaccard similarity across all the
n cloud providers and the similarity across all them cloud
providers, then generate the auditing report.
At the client side, since the auditing client receives
only a list ranking all potential redundancy deployments,
she obtains no proprietary information about the partici-
pating cloud providers’ internal infrastructures other than
the information produced intentionally to describe their
degree of independence.
5 Limitations and Practical Issues
This section discusses a few INDaaS’s limitations and
areas for further exploration, as well as some practical
issues regarding INDaaS deployment.
5.1 Limitations and Potential Solutions
Failure probability acquisition. Part of INDaaS’s util-
ity depends on the acquisition of accurate failure proba-
bility information. Without this, we cannot perform some
auditing operations, e.g., dependency graph generation at
the fault-set level and failure probability based ranking.
Collecting failure probabilities automatically is a chal-
lenging problem in practice, however. Gill et al. proposed
one approach [22]: they estimate failure probability by
dividing the number of components of a given type that
have ever failed during a time period, by the total com-
ponent population of that given type. They successfully
provide the failure probabilities of various network de-
vices (e.g., aggregation switches and core routers) dur-
ing a one year period. Regarding the failure probabili-
ties of software dependencies, the Common Vulnerabil-
ity Scoring System (or CVSS) [48] can be used to pro-
vide vulnerability-related failure probabilities for many
software libraries and packages.
Complex dependency acquisition. Our current soft-
ware dependency collector takes only static software de-
pendency data into account. In practice, many cloud out-
ages have been caused by more tricky bugs within com-
plex cloud software stacks [5,40,47,51]. Collecting such
software dependency data would be challenging, and we
are not aware of any existing systematic solutions. A
potential solution may need to access the logs gener-
ated by various cloud components, and their configura-
tion scripts. For example, we might be able to adapt soft-
ware failure detection techniques based on mining con-
sole logs [70]. Joukov et al. [33] developed a tool that
discovers static dependencies between Java programs by
parsing these programs’ code. In addition, traffic-aware
optimizations, e.g., the UDS, BDS and ASDmechanisms
proposed by Li et al. [41, 42], can greatly reduce the
workload of the network dependency acquisition.
5.2 Practical Issues
The motivation for auditing clients to use INDaaS is
straightforward: they can choose redundancy deploy-
ments with better independence property, and can under-
stand unexpected common dependencies which may lead
to correlated failures. On the other hand, especially in
the PIA case the cloud providers who offer data sources
may not explicitly benefit from honestly participating in
such a process. We now discuss what incentives the cloud
providers have to join PIA, and how they deal with dis-
honest cloud providers.
Do cloud providers have incentives to join? By par-
ticipating in PIA, a cloud provider has the opportunity to
better understand its potential dependency issues in rela-
tion to other cloud providers. While the cloud provider
may not learn which specific components overlap with
others, it can learn to what extent common dependen-
cies exist between itself and other cloud providers. PIA
thus gives cloud providers the opportunity to improve
the independence of their deployments. Another po-
tential incentive is that cloud providers not participat-
ing in PIA will not appear among the alternative cloud
providers that PIA offers to auditing clients. As a re-
sult, the clients may be less likely to learn or consider
these non-participating alternatives while evaluating var-
ious redundancy deployments. These non-participating
cloud providers may lose potential customers due to the
9
lack of the PIA “reliability label” or merely due to not be-
ing on the PIA “certified provider list”. Finally, PIA of-
fers cloud providers the opportunity to improve their rep-
utation for transparency and reliability, without risking
significant leaks of proprietary secrets about their infras-
tructure. Joining PIA offers cloud providers a privacy-
preserving way to increase the effective transparency of
their infrastructures.
Will cloud providers behave honestly? Some cloud
providers might execute PIA dishonestly, for example,
by declaring a subset of their actual component-sets. In
doing so, these providers might benefit from their dis-
honesty by appearing to have a smaller set intersection
and hence greater independence than other providers.
Thus, dishonest cloud providers might be ranked higher
in the resulting ranking list. To address this issue, we
could use the trusted hardware (e.g., TPM) to remotely
attest whether cloud providers are performing PIA as re-
quired. Recent efforts such as Excalibur [53] have de-
ployed TPM into some cloud platforms successfully.
A less technical solution is to rely on the common
business practice of “trust but leave an audit trail.” For
most executions of PIA, the auditing client simply trusts
the participating cloud providers to feed honest and ac-
curate information into the protocol, but the providers
must also save and digitally sign the data they used.
If an auditing client suspects dishonesty, or during oc-
casional “spot-checks,” a specially-authorized indepen-
dent authority – analogous to the IRS – might perform
a “meta-audit” of the provider’s PIA records, so that a
persistently dishonest participant risks eventually getting
caught.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
This section first describes our INDaaS prototype im-
plementation (§6.1), then evaluates its practicality (§6.2)
and performance (§6.3).
6.1 Implementation and Deployment
We have built an INDaaS prototype system written in a
mix of Python and Java. For clarity, this section focuses
first on our implementation of SIA, followed by PIA.
6.1.1 Structural Independence Auditing
Figure 5a shows the key components of an INDaaS pro-
totype in the SIA scenario.
Auditing client. Our auditing client software, currently
written in Python, is deployed on a machine main-
tained by the cloud provider itself, e.g., Node A in Fig-
ure 5a. The auditing client communicates with the audit-
(a) Structural Independence Auditing (SIA).
(b) Private Independence Auditing (PIA).
Figure 5: INDaaS implementation and deployment.
ing agent to send the specification and receive the audit-
ing report.
Dependency acquisition. The dependency acquisition
modules, written in Python, are deployed on each worker
machine to support the audited redundancy deployment
in a cloud, e.g., Node C-E in Figure 5a. Our current
dependency acquisition implementation includes three
open-source tools: NSDMiner [46], lshw [61], and apt-
rdepends [17], which are used to collect network, hard-
ware, and software dependencies, respectively. Since
each worker machine executes its local dependency ac-
quisition modules separately, the dependency acquisition
process can be parallelized.
Auditing agent. The auditing agent, written in Python
with the NetworkX [49] library, is deployed on another
machine, e.g., Node B in Figure 5a. It collects the depen-
dency data from the dependency acquisition modules on
each worker machine over the SSH channels. The agent
then audits the collected dependency data, and returns
the auditing report back to the auditing client.
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(a) Common network dependency. (b) Common hardware dependency. (c) Common software dependency.
Figure 6: Practicality evaluation through three case studies: (a) common network dependency, (b) common hardware
dependency, and (c) common software dependency.
6.1.2 Private Independence Auditing
Figure 5b presents the key components of our INDaaS
prototype in the PIA scenario.
Auditing client and auditing agent. In PIA, the au-
diting client and auditing agent are implemented and de-
ployed in a similar way as in SIA, except that the auditing
agent is deployed on a machine maintained by a third-
party auditor, i.e., not by any audited cloud provider.
Dependency acquisition and proxy. For each cloud
provider, there are three dependency acquisition mod-
ules deployed on each of its worker machines, as in
SIA. Moreover, we implemented a proxy in Java for each
cloud provider. The proxy first collects dependency data
from the dependency acquisition modules deployed in its
own cloud, and then runs the private set intersection car-
dinality protocol (P-SOP) together with the proxies op-
erated by other cloud providers. In particular, we imple-
mented the P-SOP protocol with MD5, Java permutation,
and the commutative RSA encryption scheme [56].
6.2 Practicality Evaluation: Case Studies
This section evaluates INDaaS’s practicality through
three small but realistic case studies with respect to un-
expected common network, hardware, and software de-
pendencies, respectively.
6.2.1 Common Network Dependency
Our first case study targets a scenario similar to the ex-
ample given in the introduction. A data center operator,
Alice, wants to deploy a new service S in her data center,
and replicates the critical states of S across two servers
within her data center. Before service deployment, Alice
uses INDaaS to structurally audit the data center net-
work in order to avoid potential correlated failures result-
ing from common network dependencies. We used a real
data center topology [9] to model Alice’s data center net-
work. As shown in Figure 6a, this data center has many
Top-of-Rack (ToR) switches (i.e., e1-e33) each of which
is connected to an individual rack. There are four core
routers (i.e., b1, b2, c1, and c2) connecting ToR switches
to the Internet.
The INDaaS first collects network dependencies, and
then executes the SIA protocol to provide auditing at
the fault graph level. The auditing report generated by
our prototype, based on the failure sampling algorithm
(which we ran for 106 rounds) and the size-based rank-
ing algorithm, suggests that {Rack 5, Rack 29} is the
most-independent deployment in this scenario.
A formal analysis indicates that there are 190 different
two-way redundancy deployments, among which 27 do
not have unexpected RGs. This means, without INDaaS,
a random selection leads to only 14% probability for
Alice to avoid correlated failures. Furthermore, if we as-
sume the failure probability of all network devices is 0.1,
the redundancy deployment {Rack 5, Rack 29} is indeed
the one with the lowest failure probability.
6.2.2 Common Hardware Dependency
As shown in Figure 6b, we have built a simple IaaS
cloud in the lab with four servers and four switches.
We used OpenStack to support the automatic virtual ma-
chine (VM) management, and deployed various services
on VMs for different uses. In particular, we deployed an
S3-like Riak [8] cloud storage service. For redundancy,
Riak was run on two VMs (VM7 and VM8).
Before releasing the Riak storage service for public
use, we ran SIA to check whether there would be any
unexpected RGs. We chose to use the minimal RG al-
gorithm and the size-based ranking algorithm. The top
4 RGs in the RG ranking list generated by our proto-
type are: {Sever2}, {Switch1}, {Core1 & Core2}, and
{VM7 & VM8}. Note that SIA randomly orders RGs
with the same size. With this list, we noticed that we had
failed to improve the reliability of Riak service via re-
dundant VMs, because the automatic placement module
in OpenStack placed the two redundant VMs on the same
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Table 2: Ranking lists of two- and three-way redundancy
deployments based on Jaccard similarities. Cloud1, 2, 3,
and 4 are equipped with Riak, MongoDB, Redis, and
CouchDB, respectively.
Rank Two-Way Redundancy Deployment Jaccard
1 Cloud2 & Cloud4 0.1419
2 Cloud2 & Cloud3 0.1547
3 Cloud1 & Cloud4 0.2081
4 Cloud1 & Cloud3 0.2939
5 Cloud3 & Cloud4 0.3489
6 Cloud1 & Cloud2 0.5059
Rank Three-Way Redundancy Deployment Jaccard
1 Cloud2 & Cloud3 & Cloud4 0.1128
2 Cloud1 & Cloud2 & Cloud4 0.1207
3 Cloud1 & Cloud3 & Cloud4 0.1353
4 Cloud1 & Cloud2 & Cloud3 0.1536
server (a shared hardware source). As a result, the failure
of that server would undermine the redundancy effort.
The fundamental cause is that the OpenStack’s automatic
virtual machine placement policy randomly selects from
the least loaded resources to host a VM.
To make the most effective redundancy deployment,
we consulted INDaaS for an auditing report on the in-
dependence of all potential redundancy deployments.
According to the report, which suggests {Server2 and
Server3}, we re-deployed the two redundant VMs for the
Riak storage service.
6.2.3 Common Software Dependency
The last case study targets a scenario where INDaaS
offers private independence auditing across multiple
cloud providers. In particular, a service provider, Alice,
wants a reliable storage solution leveraging multiple
cloud providers, e.g., iCloud uses Amazon EC2 and Mi-
crosoft Azure for its reliable storage. Suppose Alice has
found four alternative cloud providers: Cloud 1-4, each
of which offers a key-value store. Alice then consults
INDaaS for a redundancy deployment to avoid correlated
failures caused by any shared software dependency [23].
Here, we chose four popular key-value storage sys-
tems, i.e., Riak, MongoDB, Redis, and CouchDB. As
shown in Figure 6c, we assigned each one to a cloud
provider as follows, Cloud1: Riak, Cloud2: MongoDB,
Cloud3: Redis, and Cloud4: CouchDB. Suppose each
cloud provider has used our prototype to automatically
collect the software dependencies of the packages and li-
braries in its storage system. Our PIA protocol privately
computes the Jaccard similarity for each potential redun-
dancy deployment. Table 2 shows the ranking lists of var-
ious two- and three-way redundancy deployments.
Table 3: Configurations of the generated topologies.
Topology A Topology B Topology C
# switch ports 16 24 48
# core routers 64 144 576
# agg switches 128 288 1,152
# ToR switches 128 288 1,152
# servers 1,024 3,456 27,648
Total # devices 1,344 4,176 30,528
6.3 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate INDaaS’s two major components: SIA and
PIA. The performance evaluation was conducted on a
research cluster of 40 workstations equipped with Intel
Xeon Quad Core HT 3.7 GHz CPU and 16 GB RAM.
6.3.1 SIA: Efficiency v.s. Accuracy
We first explore the efficiency/accuracy trade-off be-
tween SIA’s two algorithms for analyzing a dependency
graph: the minimal RG algorithm and the failure sam-
pling algorithm (see §4.1.2). We generate three topolo-
gies from a small-scale cloud deployment to a large-scale
deployment, based on the three-stage fat tree model [45].
These topologies include the typical components within
a commercial data center: servers, Top-of-Rack (ToR)
switches, aggregation switches, and core routers. Table 3
gives the detail of these generated topologies.
We compare the computational overhead of the accu-
rate but NP-hard minimal RG algorithm to that of the
failure sampling algorithm with various sampling rounds
(103 to 107). Figure 7 shows the result that the failure
sampling algorithm runs much more efficiently than the
minimal RG algorithmwhile achieving a reasonably high
accuracy. For example, in topology B, the failure sam-
pling algorithm uses 90 minutes to detect 92% of all the
minimal RGs with 106 sampling rounds, in comparison
to 1046 minutes for the minimal RG algorithm.
6.3.2 PIA: System Overheads
To better understand the performance of PIA, we imple-
mented a comparable private independence auditing sys-
tem based on another private set intersection cardinal-
ity protocol, Kissner and Song (KS) [38], and then com-
pared this system with our PIA system.
For a private independence auditing system, the cryp-
tographic operations tend to be the major computational
bottleneck. Thus, we evaluate PIA by comparing PIA’s
P-SOP protocol with the comparable system’s KS proto-
col. Specifically, the cryptographic primitives of P-SOP
are hashing, commutative encryption, and permutation.
The KS protocol is mainly built on hashing, homomor-
phic crypto operations, and permutation.
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(a) Topology A: 1,344 devices.
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(c) Topology C: 30,528 devices.
Figure 7: Performance evaluation of the minimal RG algorithm and the failure sampling algorithm in SIA.
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Figure 8: System overhead evaluation of PIA. P-SOP (k) and KS(k) mean that there are k cloud providers participating
in the P-SOP and KS protocols, respectively. The commutative encryption in P-SOP uses a 1024-bit key, and the
homomorphic encryption in KS also uses a 1024-bit key.
In the evaluation, there are k cloud providers with n
elements in each provider’s local dataset. We set k to
2, 3 and 4, and vary n between 1,000 and 100,000 to
cover a wide range of real-world settings. We measure
and compare P-SOP with KS in terms of their band-
width and computational overheads at each such cloud
provider. Figure 8a and 8b show the bandwidth overhead
and computational overhead, respectively.
With a small number of cloud providers (e.g., k =
2), the bandwidth overhead of KS is comparable to
that of P-SOP. However, with an increasing number
of cloud providers, KS’s bandwidth overhead increases
much faster than P-SOP’s. With respect to the compu-
tational overhead, P-SOP outperforms KS by a few or-
ders of magnitude although both protocols’ computa-
tional overheads increase almost linearly with the num-
ber of elements in each cloud provider’s dataset. Alto-
gether, the evaluation shows that our PIA system can
efficiently handle large cloud providers each with even
hundreds of thousands of system components.
6.3.3 Comparison: SIA Versus PIA
Compared with the SIA where there is a trusted audi-
tor, we would also like to understand how much extra
overhead the PIA approach incurs to preserve the se-
crecy of each participating cloud provider’s data. As-
sume each cloud provider maintains a local dataset con-
taining 10,000 elements. To preserve secrecy for each
cloud provider, an auditing client relies on either the PIA
system or the comparable KS-based system to determine
the most independent redundancy deployment. For a
comparison, we also assume another setting where there
exists a trusted auditor who knows all cloud providers’
datasets. This trusted auditor runs SIA at the component-
set level of detail based on the minimal RG algorithm or
the failure sampling algorithm with 106 rounds.
Figure 9a and 9b show the computational overheads
of these independence calculations for all potential two-
and three-way redundancies, respectively. As expected,
preserving the secrecy of cloud providers’ data does in-
cur extra overhead. Surprisingly, this cost is not as high
as might be expected: we see that the computational
overhead of “PIA based on P-SOP” is less than twice that
of “SIA based on sampling (106 rounds)”. The SIA sam-
pling scheme does implement a more general analysis
than PIA, supporting fault graphs rather than just com-
ponent sets. Unsurprisingly, both “PIA based on KS” and
“SIA based on minimal RG Alg” do not scale well.
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Figure 9: Performance comparison between SIA and PIA. Each cloud provider maintains a 10,000-element dataset.
7 Related Work
Providing audits for clouds is a well-known approach to
increase reliability [54]. Practical and systematic cloud
auditing, however, still remains an open problem. To the
best of our knowledge, INDaaS is the first systematic ef-
fort to enable independence audits for cloud services.
Privacy-preserving auditing systems. Following the
auditing concept proposed by Shah et al. [54], many
privacy-preserving auditing systems have been proposed
extending this approach [55, 63–66,71].
Similar to PIA, iRec [74] and Xiao et al. [69] also
focused on analyzing correlated failures resulting from
the common infrastructure dependencies across multiple
cloud providers. These efforts proposed using the private
set intersection cardinality protocol [21] and the secure
multi-party computation protocol [72] to perform the de-
pendency analysis in a privacy-preserving fashion, re-
spectively. These initial efforts did not scale to handle
realistically large cloud datasets, however,
Diagnosis & accountability systems. Diagnosis sys-
tems, unlike auditing, attempt to discover failures after
they occur. For example, many inference-based diagnosis
systems [5, 15, 31, 37] have been proposed to obtain the
network dependencies of a cloud service when a failure
occurs. Unlike existing diagnosis systems, NetPilot [68]
aimed to mitigate these failures rather than directly lo-
calize their sources.
Accountability systems attempt to place blame after
failures occur, whereas our auditing system attempts to
prevent failures in the first place. Haeberlen [24] pro-
posed using third-party verifiable evidence to determine
whether the cloud customer or the cloud provider should
be held liability when a failure occurs.
Private set operations. Secure multi-party computation
(SMPC) [72] is a general approach to supporting com-
putation on private data including set operations. How-
ever, current circuit-based SMPC protocols are too ex-
pensive and scale poorly to large computations. Arawal
et al. [1] proposed a private set intersection cardinality
protocol based on commutative encryption. This proto-
col was limited to two-party cases, however. Vaidya and
Clifton [58] extended this protocol to support more than
two parties, and optimized its efficiency.
The first private set intersection cardinality protocol
based on homomorphic encryption was proposed by
Freedman et al. [21], which could privately compute the
number of elements common to two datasets. Hohen-
berger et al. proposed enhancements to this protocol pro-
tocol [30]. Later, Kissner and Song proposed multi-party
private set operations based upon homomorphic encryp-
tion and polynomial generation [38].
8 Conclusion
This paper has presented INDaaS, an architecture to au-
dit the independence of future or existing redundant ser-
vice deployments in the cloud. While only a start, our
proof-of-concept prototype and experiments suggest that
INDaaS could be both practical and effective in detecting
and heading off correlated failure risks before they occur.
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